SPEEDY TRIAL/RETRIAL, ILLINOIS

SPEEDY TRIAL/IMPEACHMENT

People v. Williams, No. 93573 (April 3, 2003) Appeal, 5th Dist.
Reversed and remanded. Illinois Supreme Court.

Because the delays attributable to the defendant in the first charged
case of contributing to the delinquency of a minor are not attributable
to him in a subsequently filed charge of murder, which is subject to
mandatory joinder, the defendant's trial for the later filed murder
charges was conducted in abrogation of his right to a speedy trial; and
his convictions for murder must be vacated. Further, the trial court
committed plain error when it allowed the State to impeach the defendant
with an inconsistent statement not in evidence without calling the
person who allegedly witnessed the inconsistent statement on rebuttal.
(FITZGERALD) GARMAN, partial concurrence, partial dissent, THOMAS,
dissent

In 1997, two men were shot to death at the Belle Manor apartment complex
in Alton. The individual who was implicated as the shooter was a teenage
male. This defendant was one of several individuals who were implicated
as having been with the perpetrator at the time. In connection with the
death of one of the victims, defendant was indicted in the circuit court
of Madison County for contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile, and
he was arrested. After he had been incarcerated for 168 days, the State
charged him with first degree murder on an accountability theory for the
same homicide. Brought to trial one week later, a jury found him guilty
on both of those counts, as well as other charges.

There had been delays in bringing the defendant to trial, but, for
purposes of speedy-trial analysis, these delays were attributable to the
defendant. Thus, he could not successfully complain that the
speedy-trial statute had been violated as to the initial contributing
charge. However, these delays had all occurred before the information
charging murder had been filed, and, the supreme court noted, these two
charges should have been joined because they arose from the same facts.
Because the two charges were subject to compulsory joinder, the delay
which was attributable to the defendant on the contributing charge
should not have been attributed to him on the murder charge arising from
the same homicide, which charge did not even exist when the delay
occurred. This murder charge should have been dismissed for violation of
the statutory right to speedy trial.

As to defendant's other convictions arising from the same incident,
which included charges based on the death of the second individual, the
Illinois Supreme Court ordered a new trial because of plain error in
allowing the State to impeach the defendant with facts which it did not
produce in evidence.

SPEEDY TRIAL/RETRIAL

People v. Huff, No. 88852 (January 29, 2001) Appeal, 4th Dist. Vacated
and remanded. Illinois Supreme Court.

Defense counsel’s failure to specifically cite section 103–5(b) in the
speedy-trial demand did not render the demand ineffective. See People v.
Dockery, 313 Ill. App. 3d 684, 686 (2000) (giving effect to demand that
bore heading " ‘DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL,’ " which was filed on
counsel’s entry of appearance, stated that defendant "demands a speedy
trial by jury in the above styled causes," but failed to specifically
cite speedy-trial statute).

The demand filed by the defendant in the present case was sufficient to
invoke the protections of the speedy-trial statute. The caption of the
form filed by defense counsel explicitly referred to the defendant’s
speedy-trial demand–the document bore the heading, "Entry of Appearance,
Plea of Not Guilty, and Demand for Speedy Jury Trial." In addition, the
body of the form expressly invoked the defendant’s statutory rights,
demanding trial within 160 days from the date of the demand. Nothing in
the form, or the circumstances in which it was filed, suggests that the
document was calculated to camouflage the defendant’s demand or
otherwise hide it from the prosecution’s notice. Indeed, at no time in
the circuit court proceedings did the prosecution argue that it had been
unaware of the defendant’s demand for a speedy trial or had been unsure
whether he was actually out of custody.

Trial and appellate court erred when they ordered defendant's case
dismissed because defective speedy trial act demand constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Demand was not deficient merely
because it failed to cite statute specifically. It was sufficient to
apprise state of its purpose, and was not camouflaged in any way.
However, since proper time calculation was never made, case must be
remanded for consideration of merits of motion.

People v. Crane, No. 88454 (January 19, 2001) Appeal, 1st Dist. Appellate court reversed. Remanded.

The Illinois Supreme Court was asked to decide whether defendant Anthony
Crane's constitutional right to a speedy retrial was violated when 26
months elapsed between the time the appellate court reversed defendant's
conviction for murder and defendant filed his motion for dismissal on
speedy-retrial grounds. The court balanced the factors set forth in
Barker: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the
prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and defendant's assertion of his
right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116-17, 92 S. Ct. at
2192. All four factors are closely related and no one factor is
necessary or sufficient to a finding that the right to a speedy trial
has been violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116-19,
92 S. Ct. at 2192-93. Although any factual determinations made by the
trial court in a constitutional speedy trial claim must be given
deference, the ultimate determination of whether the defendant's speedy
trial rights have been violated is subject to de novo review. After
balancing the opposing interests in light of the circumstances of this
case, the court concluded that defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy retrial was not violated.